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THIERRY JUTEL
Societies of  Control, Compulsory Ecstasy 
and the Neo-Liberal Subject
ARTICLE
THE RISE OF SOCIETIES OF CONTROL
Discussing control within the context of a culture 
in which flexibility, opportunity, mobility and 
transformations are tropes of the most banal media 
text and self-help manual is at best iconoclastic. 
Popular media are full of promises and recipes for life-
transforming experiences and benefits under the guise 
of re-branding of the self, career plans, management 
of one’s assets and life-style strategies. US magazines 
such as Wired, and Fast Capitalism, or New Zealand 
ones such as Unlimited and Idealog are cheerleaders 
for the dominant economic and political discourse of 
enlightened opportunism. Those magazines do not 
simply advocate the benefits of a truly meritocratic 
society facilitated by liberating new technologies but 
re-cast the work and life of the neo-liberal subject as 
that of a creative and inventive sports competitor or 
adventurer. 
As these two full-page advertisements from Wired 
suggest, the contemporary corporate subject’s life 
is more akin to that of an explorer and an extreme 
sport practitioner – a corporate version of Harrison 
Ford’s Indiana Jones – rather than that of the typical 
corporate employee, the type of which was best 
Figure 1: Wired 13.09 September 2005, 76.
Figure 2: Wired 8.09 September 2000, 243.
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captured by Gregory Peck in The Man in a Grey Flannel Suit 1 or the chillingly subservient 
Gregory Peck in the cinematic adaptation of Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead 2.
These last two films both paradoxically reveal, and even embrace, in the case of The 
Fountainhead, the paranoia underlying the subservience to power of the cold-war corporate 
man. For the contemporary neo-liberal subject, limits, constraints and obstacles are challenges 
to be overcome as a form of mental, physical and technological self-realisation. The emphasis 
is on being one’s exhilarated manager and life coach rather than calling upon self-abnegation, 
sacrifice or paranoia. The enormously successful Who Moved My Cheese? An Amazing Way 
to Deal with Change in Your Work and in Your Life 3 encapsulates in a populist and pseudo-
therapeutic tone the neo-liberal denial of the social and the prescriptive manufacturing of 
the self as the site of all economic and social tensions. Johnson’s self-help book is written 
as the tale of mice that discover that their cozy access to cheese is threatened by changing 
circumstances, read re-structuration, outsourcing, lay-off, firing or early retirement. This, 
at best, inane book constitutes a kind of quick-fix therapy for people about to be laid off or 
who have just been laid off, or morale-boosting comfort for those who want to measure their 
superior adaptive skills in response to those inferior employees who still may understand the 
“precarity”4 of their employment and their fate as a form of social injustice. But as the book 
states “if you do not change you can become extinct;”5  what is the social when it’s all about your 
fate as a member of the ever-increasing list of endangered species? Rewards and successes 
are measured by one’s ability to recast evolution at the scale of individual agency.
The age is that of a search, if not of evolutionary blackmail, for the realisation of the self; 
limitations are no longer obstacles so much as excuses for the weak of mind and heart. In 
his attacks on neo-liberalism, Pierre Bourdieu specifically pointed out the recklessness of the 
project and the systematic undermining of the social. The rhetoric of natural selection and 
evolution is barely concealed under the powerful laws of the market, de-regulated capital 
flows and dismantling of social structures:
The movement toward the neoliberal utopia of a pure and perfect market is 
made possible by the politics of financial deregulation. And it is achieved through 
the transformative and, it must be said, destructive action of all of the political 
measures (of which the most recent is the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI), designed to protect foreign corporations and their investments from 
national states) that aim to call into question any and all collective structures 
that could serve as an obstacle to the logic of the pure market: the nation, 
whose space to manoeuvre continually decreases; work groups, for example 
through the individualisation of salaries and of careers as a function of individual 
competences, with the consequent atomisation of workers; collectives for the 
defence of the rights of workers, unions, associations, cooperatives; even the 
family, which loses part of its control over consumption through the constitution 
of markets by age groups. 6
The traditional bounds of sclerotic institutions have been torn away by the liberating forces 
of neo-liberal utopia. Any remaining vestiges of control are associated with antiquated 
institutions which have failed to convert to the virtues of de-regulation revealed as the laws 
of natural selection.
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Gilles Deleuze, in an essay on the demise of disciplinary societies, characterised by “vast spaces 
of enclosure”7 and the rise of societies of control saliently illustrated by the corporation “a spirit, 
a gas,” argues that institutions such as the factory, the school, the church, and the family no 
longer function as efficient sites of control. The association between a specific architectural, 
discursive and social space as described by Foucault is, according to Deleuze, giving way to 
a discourse of the self as location of control disguised as a liberative exaltation. The model 
of the subject disciplined by an institution and awarded a position and a voice through the 
naturalisation of the institution’s discursive authority no longer works in a context where the 
source of knowledge and action has been shifted to the self as agent of transformation. As 
Deleuze argues, the monolithic institution empowered by naturalised notions of a hierarchical 
and compartmentalised social order is under threat from the dispersive logic of post-
industrial capitalism. The transition that Deleuze describes is that where the subjugation and 
subjectivisation of the individual under capitalism is no longer located within the confines of 
the institution and disciplined within its spatial imaginary but rather “the operation of markets 
is now the instrument of social control”. It’s nowhere and everywhere at the same time. The 
fluctuations of the market and the reactive logic of its simultaneous and networked events 
require constant mobilisation, what Bill Gates calls a “digital nervous system.”8 If the subject 
in a disciplinary society could fantasise of a communal liberation as in René Clair’s A Nous la 
liberté 9 where a workers’ rebellion overthrows their capitalist oppressors, or King Vidor’s Our 
Daily Bread 10 where the combined forces of displaced migrants create an agrarian utopia, 
the subject of a control society cannot conceive of emancipation since control is inscribed in 
all form of actions or more exactly re-actions. Deleuze explains: “the disciplinary man was a 
discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous 
network.”11  The problem however is that “in the disciplinary societies one was always starting 
again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in societies of control 
one is never finished with anything.”12  What changes in the advent of control society is the 
modalities of counter-action or the absence thereof. There is no externality, no architectural 
outside of the institutions since the institution has been replaced by integrated circuits of 
endless flows. As the second image on page 27 suggests, the discourse of new technologies 
is of course central to the enabling forces of neo-liberalism.
NEO-LIBERALISM AND TECHNO-POPULISM
Gilles Châtelet, in an untranslated pataphysical treatise Vivre et penser comme des porcs13 
describes the emergence of a new techno-populist aristocracy responsible for, or at least 
complicit with, the discourse of “European becoming” through the lifting of social regulations, 
the abandonment of social causes and the belief in the scientific and rational processes 
of markets, in other words the advent of a post-social utopia. He specifically parodies the 
enthusiasm of the French post-Mitterand left in which the historical duties of socialist politics 
or at least the engagement with the idea of the social have been replaced by a fixation with the 
establishment of a fluid, exhilarated and supposedly enlightened capitalism. Neo-liberalism 
deploys administrative, institutional, scientific and rational discourses to justify the social cost 
of economic reforms, the removal of social protection and the acceptance that the price of 
individual success is the marginalisation of large groups of people.14 The State in the neo-
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liberal conception, when it is not actualising and enforcing social divisions through spatial 
demarcations, is no longer an instrument of social progress but an impediment and even the 
cause of social injustice. This is expressed in the title of a discussion paper by New Zealand’s 
National Party, Saving the Next Generation from Welfare Dependency 15 which reflects a very 
common rhetoric in neo-liberal circles throughout Western societies and states:
The numbers of people on welfare have grown beyond the wildest dreams of 
the architects of the Welfare State. As a consequence, it is National’s view that 
rather than be part of a dependence solution, the welfare state has become 
part of the problem.16
Under the guise of a pursuit of efficiency and productivity, the logic of economic markets asserts 
that the opportunity of individual economic gains is a salubrious task and a means of saving 
society from irremediable physical and moral collapse as the title of the above-mentioned 
study unequivocally proposes.17 In the National Party’s analysis of social welfare we see the 
notion of moral collapse in the insinuation that welfare dependency is a form of substance 
abuse and the recipient of social welfare a pathetic junkie. In a speech by John Key in his 
role as new leader of the conservative National Party and reported on the front page of The 
Dominion Post on 31 January 2007, the assimilation of poverty, social welfare and addiction 
is made explicit and at the centre of his party’s socio-political project. John Key specifically 
mentioned the case of a street of Hamilton where the public housing inhabitants embody all 
the attributes of the neo-liberal nightmare: they are unemployed, addicted, with families of 
single mothers in a permanent state of moral and psychological dead end.18 Such rhetoric is 
of course common in many Western states since Thatcher’s Britain of the 1980s. The social 
welfare reform programmes now doxa among most Western countries holding that people 
on the dole should be made to work is the logical outcome of this: coercion is justifiable for 
the good of the individual who has lost a sense of direction and needs.
Neo-liberal conceptions assert that the individual is (and should be) a free agent who makes 
rational decisions based on an economic course of action. The individual is allowed to calculate 
its best sets of outcomes; societal structures are there only to ensure a certain degree of 
fairness but not to deter individual initiative. In other words there is, in the nature of neo-
liberalism, something which appeals to the ludic. As Johan Huizinga argued
it is through this playing that society expresses its interpretation of life and 
the world. By this we do not mean that plays turn into culture, rather that in its 
earliest phases culture has the play-character.19 
As Châtelet illustrates, neo-liberalism does not offer itself as an ideology but as a set of rules 
and fields of intervention to empower the individual’s exploration, risk-taking and initiative. It 
encourages the liberation and experience of intense, if not altered, states of mind as a form of 
individuation (an argument made by those studying contemporary psycho-pharmacology).
The neo-liberal individual positions himself at the intersection and as a conduit of 
transformative forces. Commitment to that cause does not manifest itself through the 
expression of convictions but rather, and this is one of the foci later in this paper, an economy 
of affect, a disciplined and disciplinarian deployment and management of intensities. What 
Châtelet especially attacks is the blackmail of the subject inherent in neo-liberal conceptions, 
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which, as I pointed out earlier in relation to self-help books, is that one must not simply change 
along a teleological axis but preferably must transform and reformulate.  The modalities of 
this transformation involve an escape from the social and a re-programming of affects and 
emotions as a form of evolutionary development. Gains in the neo-liberal play can only be 
achieved by taking risk with the multiplication of “limit-experiences” – like the climber hanging 
by a few fingers in the advertisement included earlier – recast as strategic and competitive 
advantages. The paradox of this discourse is evident: far from being the composed and rational 
subject, the neo-liberal explorer must be a risk-taker always ready to re-invent him or herself 
through the experience of altering and affective forces. The task is caught in a double-bind 
best articulated in the complementary meanings of the fix as seen in this other advertisement 
from Wired: on the one hand the fix suggests 
that something is broken down and that repairs 
can be provided by a tool. On the other hand the 
fix is an answer which suggests, with its obvious 
reference to drug culture, that the experience of 
individuating intensities and specifically for this 
purpose, the encounter with technology, can be 
the paradoxical remedy to what is articulated as 
a generalised symptomatology of identity.
TRANSFORMATIONAL MODALITY 1: 
RECOGNISE AND ACCEPT THE SYMPTOM
Because neo-liberalism is a discourse of change 
and promise, it has to first identify those forces 
that resist its implementation.  As I pointed 
out above, the notion of welfare dependency 
is one of the most common pronouncements 
about the pathology of social welfare and of the 
destitute. Problems are not systemic but rather 
formulated at the level of personal failings, 
psychological limitations, lack of self-motivation and illness. 
In the neo-liberal moral order not all pathologies are created equal. Between the epistemology 
of the alcoholic homeless person and the hyperactive and ebullient caffeinated executive 
there is a distinct hierarchy.  However, the underlying assumption is that pathologies convey 
a sense of authenticity and legitimacy and shift the grounds from the realm of the social to 
the scene of the individual’s illness. 
As Ulrich Beck has argued in Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, neo-liberal societies 
have now accepted the fact that there can be no social and economic progress without a 
certain amount of social cost. Risk societies do not solve social problems but rather displace 
the scene of their resolution: 
Figure 3: Wired 8.09 September 2000, 185.
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Inequalities by no means disappear. They merely become redefined in terms 
of an individualization of social risks. The result is that social problems are 
increasingly perceived in terms of psychological dispositions: as personal 
inadequacies, guilt feeling, anxieties, conflicts, and neuroses. There emerges, 
paradoxically, a new immediacy of individual and society, a direct relation 
between crisis and sickness. Social crises appear as individual crises, which 
are no longer (or are only very indirectly) perceived in terms of their rootedness 
in the social realm. 20 
The cost and remedy for this crisis of the individual is no longer articulated as a collective 
or social responsibility. Alain Ehrenberg has argued, for instance, that the rise in depression 
in the Western world is, in great part, related to the relative increase of emphasis on the 
responsibilities and expectations of the individual rather than of the collective.21 In other 
words, social inequities are not resolved, rather psychologised and individualised. Thus the 
symptomatology and the crisis of the self is not simply a by-product of neo-liberalism and its 
emphasis on individual agency, it is the fuel of its transformational engine. The self has to 
be put in crisis or, to use a term Châtelet particularly resents, the self needs a “challenge” 
(please pronounce with a French accent). 
The recognition and acceptance of the self as a symptomatic battlefield is the necessary 
condition for the liberatory discourse of neo-liberalism. In the neo-liberal moral order, however, 
not all pathologies are created equal. One needs the right kinds of symptoms. As argued earlier, 
between the epistemology of the alcoholic homeless mother and the hyperactive and ebullient 
caffeinated (if not cocained or methamphetamined) executive there exists an irreconcilable 
gap. The underlying assumption, however, is that 
pathologies do convey a sense of authenticity and 
legitimacy and shift the grounds from the realm of the 
social to the site of the individual’s pathology. Popular 
media examples of the universalisation and the 
banality of the symptom abound. In this advertisement 
from The New York Times, the humour is entirely based 
on the familiarity and acceptance of the dysfunction 
of the self and the necessity of self-management, self-
prognosis and self-prescription: “Psychotherapy sale: 
bring your emotional baggage and fill it with mood 
enhancing bargains.”
The call to alter one’s mood through a participation in 
consumer culture is a step further than the popular 
bumper stickers which encourage the reader to “shop 
till you drop”22 or which proclaim the driver “born to 
shop.” It is both the banality of the statement and 
its aristocratic self-awareness, thus its humour (the 
assumed luxury to indulge and the familiarity with the 
Figure 4: New York Times, 13 June 1999.
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discourse of psychopathologies as an authentic expression of the self) which constitute the 
specific function of this advertisement. 
Another example of this emphasis on the acceptance of the symptom as existential condition 
is an advertisement (see alongside) for Cisco from the New Yorker magazine with the title 
“restlessness.” This is a less obviously immediate text than 
that of the New York Times advertisement which invites a 
knowing complicity between reader and text. As evident in 
many other advertisements for management systems, this 
Cisco advertisement features an individual outside of the 
office. The office as institution and architectural space has 
disappeared while remaining a point of reference: 
Cubicles in the form of wide-open spaces. 
Corner offices that look like company 
cafeterias. No matter where you wander to 
find inspiration, the wireless, self-defending 
networks of Cisco let you access the office 
anytime, anywhere.23
The office is present as a virtualised space. This 
transformation of the office specifically traces the passage 
Deleuze described between societies of discipline and 
societies of control. The disciplinary architectural regime 
which interpellated the subject within specific spatial 
confines has been replaced by the roaming subject: both solitary wanderer caught in an 
introspective moment and anxious worker never leaving his tasks and responsibilities. The 
employee’s restlessness is here not so much proposed as an inarticulated need for efficiency 
but more precisely as the necessary condition for his creative wandering. Inspiration, rather 
than duty or responsibility, is cryptically associated here with, and initiated by, restlessness. 
It is an epistemology: out of the experience of restlessness emerges a form of productivity. 
Cisco is there to facilitate experiencing the symptom of the unsettled mind; it’s not there to 
resolve the experience of the symptom but to embrace its transformational potential.
This double articulation of the symptom as both a generalised condition of existence and 
the source of understanding and action is remarkably illustrated in the film Fight Club 24. 
The film details the transformation of a dysfunctional, emotionally and intellectually drained 
man who embraces his symptoms and his pathology to the extent that he lives as two people 
at the same time and finds salvation by organising a hyper-masculine militaristic group of 
men dedicated to awakening themselves by engaging in fist fights. By the end of the film, 
the group’s mobilisation turns to anti-corporate uprising, while the character catches up 
with his destructive alter ego. At the beginning of the film a voice-over of the main character 
details his symptoms of mental exhaustion. Lying in bed, the character speaks directly to the 
viewer in the mode of a film noir character, paranoid and desperate, but also speaking as if 
in confession, or in the therapeutic scene:
Back up, let me start earlier. For six months I could not sleep. I could not sleep, 
I could not sleep, I could not sleep. With insomnia nothing’s real. Everything’s 
far away. Everything is a copy of a copy of a copy. 
Figure 5: New Yorker 2 May, 2005, 47.
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While articulating the symptoms of his crisis, we see him in a variety of office scenes, and 
then engaged in a bureaucratic and jargonistic conversation with a supervisor. Then he is 
home and sitting on his toilet; he is ordering something – talking to a customer service person 
on the phone as he thumbs through a catalogue: “Like so many others I had become slave 
to the Ikea nesting instinct… What kind of dining set defines me as a person?” He is both 
deeply aware of his status as a consumer and of the shallowness and feeling of entrapment 
this produces. He cannot feel anymore. As he walks through his apartment the camera pans 
to follow him while objects he has purchased appear on-screen with the caption from the 
catalogues from where he has purchased them. The “psychotherapy sale” does not work for 
him any more. However, there is no alienation (which implies a social order); there is boredom: 
the greatest of crimes because it implies the lack of affective stimulation. After a hard cut to 
his doctor’s office he is begging for something to relieve his pain (“Can you please give me 
something?”), understood here as requesting a remedy for insomnia, exhaustion, boredom 
and affectlessness. All the doctor suggests is for him to see “real” pain (“see the guys with 
testicular cancer”). Progressively, we come to know that he has joined several support groups 
for extremely sick and in some cases terminally-ill people. The status conferred by a “real” 
ailment and the sympathy directed his way is a substitute for having an existence of his own. 
He thrives on the baroque and emotional overloading of confessional and unselfish final 
pronouncements of incurably sick people. The care for the self here has been replaced by the 
maintenance of the self by embracing vicariously the affective intensities of pathologies.
Like other texts of popular culture which seem to capture something of the spirit of the time, 
Fight Club is best as concentrated and highly-focused assessment. It is remarkably perceptive 
in its depiction of the epistemology of the symptom by taking seriously the premise of the 
central character and constructing a world around him. It also demonstrates the social capital 
and strategic advantage attributed to psychopathologies. The acuteness of its prognosis is 
achieved by realising the central significance of the symptom in the production of affect.  In 
the film even masculinity is a pathology and it is exactly why the main character decides to 
embrace it: masculinity becomes valid and authentic because it is a symptom and as such 
allows for the alteration of the mind and body in order to create intensities, the only possible 
transformational modality. The storyline involving the anti-corporate plot of the film seems very 
much like a pretext, despite the fact that it suggests the potent link between the corporatisation 
of the world and the economy of affect.
TRANSFORMATIONAL MODALITY 2: ECONOMY OF AFFECT
As the three examples suggest in different ways, the discourse of symptoms is not associated 
with aberrations or with inauthenticity. Symptoms are the source and the logic of transformation 
as required in the liberated neo-liberal world. What results is an economy of affect: intensities 
are required to generate the necessary adaptive leap. As Brian Massumi has discussed, affect 
is unqualified intensity, a stimulus that unleashes neural and physical reactions but without 
inscribing them in narrative or biographical contexts.25 Rather, affect requires an expenditure 
which functions outside of traditional sensory-motor schemas based on stimulation-reaction-
action. Essentially, emotions structure experience; affect opens up to the new, the not-already 
experienced. Just as the characters of Fight Club need to bash each other’s faces to a pulp in 
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order to awaken, to empower themselves and to find clarity of mind, the neo-liberal subject 
must espouse, generate and compete for the transformational modalities of affect. The three 
advertisements I discussed at the beginning of this essay illustrate this imperative: one must 
dispose oneself to the altering forces of physical and mental exertion. 
As Paul Virilio has discussed extensively, one of the components of the economy of affect is 
speed.26 The classical notion that authority emanates from a closed system and a disciplinarian 
form of control has been replaced by the ascendence of “ultrarapid forms of free-floating 
control.”27 The paradox is that in this contemporary conception of speed, it is seen both as the 
“natural” occurrence of a free society and an object of constant invisible control. Power is not 
embodied in the body of the despot or in the legitimacy of abstract institutions (school, church, 
state...); it lies in the hyperactive, schizophrenic logic of speed. The contemporary notion that 
speed culture is leading to substantial changes, either for the worst or for the best, is based 
on the assumption that new practices and technologies are not simply changing aspects of 
our lives but they are transforming our cultures and consciousnesses, irrevocably blurring the 
lines between the human, the inhuman and the posthuman. The most common justifications 
for this belief are to be found in the perceived effects of the development of the internet and 
the digitalisation of culture, the hyperactivation of popular culture into a reactive and affective 
system of individual connections, and the evolution of consumer culture into an intensity-
based exchange. Therefore speed culture is less a set of observations about the hyperbolic 
increase in digital, communication and human connectivity but more a set of rhetorical, 
symptomatological and aesthetic forms 
whose deep contradictions are the 
measure of its predominance. Once 
again an advertisement from Wired 
magazine (see alongside) captures the 
rhetorical banality of this: “Espresso or 
the new economy? What gets you wired? 
If you’re excited about the shift to a 
digital, networked world, you’re ready for 
the new economy – one where industry 
is fueled more by ideas than machines, 
and people work with their brains, not 
their hands.” 
We find the same rhetoric: the emphasis 
on the parallels between the economic 
order and a caffeinated mind; the 
emphasis on reaction and intensities; and 
the underlying assumption that the next 
stage of evolution can be manufactured 
by the logic of the hyperactive brain 
stimulated by the encounter with digital 
technology.
Figure 6: Wired 8.07 July 2000, 281.
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The reactive and transformational logic of affect is, in the discourse of the ‘new economy’, 
closely associated with a form of organisation which corresponds to Deleuze’s definition of 
a society of control. In a book entitled Business @ The Speed of Thought: Using a Digital 
Nervous System, Bill Gates calls for  organisation management structures relying on a “digital 
nervous system.”  He comments:
I’m not talking about something metaphysical or about some weird cyborg 
episode out of Star Trek. But it is something new and important. To function in 
the digital age, we have developed a new digital infrastructure. It’s like the human 
nervous system. The biological nervous system triggers your reflexes so that you 
can react quickly to danger or need. It gives you the information you need as 
you ponder issues and make choices. You’re alert to the most important things, 
and your nervous system blocks out the information that isn’t important to you. 
Companies need to have that same kind of nervous system – the ability to run 
smoothly and efficiently, to respond quickly to emergencies and opportunities, 
to quickly get valuable information to the people in the company who need it, 
the ability to quickly make decisions and interact with customers.28
While refuting the science-fiction scenario of his proposition, Gates is of course delineating 
an atopia: the architectural and institutional space of the office has disappeared in favour 
of a networked and fluid virtual organisation lubricated by a series of affective triggers. It 
is another version of the “friction-free capitalism” Mattelart discusses in his assessment of 
the discourse of globalisation29: perfect organisational viscosity in the service of efficiency. 
The achievements of the individuals are measured by their capacity to experience and to 
contribute to the flow of capital. The reward for the individual employee is the exhilaration 
brought about by the transformational experience. In the society of control what counts is not 
the disciplinarian submission of the subject to the institution but rather his bodily disposition 
to affective experience which in turns serves the interest of the dominant order. As I have 
discussed here, advertisements, especially in relation to technology and management systems, 
abound with images of ecstatic subjects caught in the throes of experiential alterations. 
CONCLUSION: COMPULSORY ECSTASY
In a commercial for Microsoft XP operating system released in October 2001 and entitled 
“Soaring Anthem,” a series of individuals who log on to their computers and connect to 
a wireless network literally take flight above a field, a library, an office, a street, and a 
restaurant.30 This is what Châtelet refers to as techno-populism, that is to say, the enthusiastic 
celebration of the liberating potential of digital technologies, and what I have described 
here as the economy of affect. What matters for the characters of this commercial is not 
so much the capacity to perform tasks but more particularly to experience intensities. As I 
discussed previously, the achievements of the individuals are measured by their capacity to 
experience. The assumption is that the more one opens oneself to the intensities the more 
one can disconnect oneself from the social but in exchange make oneself available to the 
forces of change. This is the way in which control operates in the neo-liberal utopia: it is not 
cast as a discourse of boundaries and limitations but as a radical demand on the individual. 
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What is remarkable here, and underlines something latent in the ecstatic celebration of new 
technologies in advertisement, is the reference to altered states of mind and pleasurable 
bodily experiences akin to drug culture. In what must constitute one of the most trenchant 
contradictions of our times, the characteristics attributed to this ecstatic neo-liberal subject 
(stimulation, responsiveness, openness to affective experiences) are also used to describe the 
degeneration of everyday life mainly through the curse of popular culture. If the caffeinated, 
multitasking, hyperactive and exhilarated employee is the key to the recasting of economic 
and political relations in the neo-liberal fairy tale, the intoxicated and dissipated individual 
may be its illegitimate sibling consigned to a salutary oblivion. We live in a world in which the 
rhetoric of drug culture has been recuperated by the banal discourse of self-realisation in 
the service of a neo-liberal economic order. 
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